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Executive summary  
This document is deliverable D2.5 (version 1) – “Societal impact report” of Task T2.5 within WP2 – “Privacy” 
of the PROTECT project. The aim of D2.5 is to identify and address the ethical and legal implications of the 
technical solutions being developed in the context of the PROTECT project by summarizing discussions 
between the project partners and exchanges with the Ethical and Legal Advisory Group (ELAG) as well as with 
other external experts.  
The overall PROTECT research project addresses both public security missions (border control) and societal 
concerns (fundamental rights and social values). The development of a new framework for border control 
(from physical to increasingly digital borders) and related new methods for the management and control of 
population flows at borders (e.g. biometric passport, ABC gates, constitution of large scale IT systems 
managing visa applications, contactless biometric border control) instantiate the tension between two 
constitutive obligations linking modern states and its citizens, namely between freedom and security. The 
main ethical challenge in this matter is to find the proportional balance between the legitimate interests at 
stake in the exercise of border control missions and the preservation of fundamental rights, such as the rights 
to privacy and data protection of travellers, including both European and third-country nationals.  Such 
concerns appear at the core of PROTECT proposal. 
In order to ensure that ethical and legal aspects are thoroughly investigated and addressed within the 
PROTECT project, a specific work package –  “WP2 Privacy” – is dedicated  to explore the privacy issues raised 
by the PROTECT system, translate those issues into operational requirements usable for the system designers 
and assess the privacy compliance of the technological constructs. In this WP2: 
- Ethical and legal experts at UNAMUR study the legal frameworks, conduct acceptability studies of 
different biometric solutions and examine ethical and privacy issues related to the PROTECT system; 
- An Ethical & Legal Advisory Group (ELAG) consisting of three independent experts with extensive 
experience in privacy or biometrics and identity management issues independently monitor and 
review the activities and outputs of the project. 
This first version of D2.5 – “Societal impact report” –  contains a summary of ethical and legal discussions 
held during 3 different events: 
1. A meeting “on the impact of privacy regulations on system architecture & technical solutions” which 
was organized on 4th July 2017 at the University of Reading. The objective of this meeting was for 
UNAMUR to present to the other partners the implications of the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) on the processing of biometric data in the context of border control;  
2. A first ELAG meeting which took place at University of Reading on July 5th 2017. The objective of that 
meeting was to discuss the ethical and legal implications of a potential scenario implementing the 
PROTECT solution taking into account existing and forthcoming EU regulations in the field of border 
control and data protection; 
3. A PROTECT panel at the 11th International conference on computers, privacy and data protection 
(CPDP2018) organized by UNAMUR and which took place on January 25th in Brussels. This panel was 
entitled “privacy and data protection issues related to the use of contactless multimodal biometrics 
at border-crossings” and was the opportunity to share some views with important actors such as the 
European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) and the JHA Counsellor at the Permanent 
Representation of Finland to the EU.  
Please note that this deliverable is a first version of D2.5. A second version D2.5 – Societal impact report is 
due at M34 and will integrate the next discussions and exchanges on ethical and legal issues with the ELAG 
and other external experts.  
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Definitions 
Article 29 Working Party: The Article 29 Working Party is composed of representatives from all EU Data 
Protection Authorities, the EDPS and the European Commission. It was set up under the Directive 95/46/EC. 
It has advisory status and acts independently.  
Automated Border Control system: means a system which allows for an automated border passage, and 
which is composed of a self-service system and an e-gate.  
Biometric data: Article 4(14) of the GDPR defines “biometric data” as personal data resulting from specific 
technical processing relating to the physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of a natural person, 
which allow or confirm the unique identification of that natural person, such as facial images or dactyloscopic 
data. 
E-gate: means an infrastructure operated by electronic means where the effective crossing of an external 
border takes place 
Ethical and Legal Advisory Group: An Ethical and Legal Advisory Group (ELAG) has been appointed in the 
PROTECT project. The ELAG consists of three independent experts in and legal issues with extensive 
experience in privacy or biometrics and identity management issues. The presence of an ethical board 
of independent experts is meant to exert a sort of permanent call to also consider and care about the 
ethical and social acceptability of the PROTECT conduct and outputs. 
European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS): The system will apply to visa-exempt third 
country nationals, as well as those who are exempt from the airport transit visa requirement. They will need 
to obtain a travel authorisation before their trip, via an online application. The information submitted in each 
application will be automatically processed against other EU databases to determine whether there are 
grounds to refuse a travel authorisation. When no hits or elements requiring further analysis are identified, 
the travel authorisation will be issued automatically within a short time. If there is a hit or an element 
requiring analysis, the application will be handled manually by the competent authorities.  
Facial image: means digital images of the face with sufficient image resolution and quality to be used in 
automated biometric matching 
EURODAC system: The EURODAC system enables the comparison of fingerprints of asylum applicants and 
illegal immigrants. The Members States of the system are the 28 EU members, Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein 
and Switzerland. The objective of EURODAC in the asylum process is to facilitate the application of the Dublin 
III Regulation. This Regulation provides a mechanism for determining which country is responsible for 
examining applications for international protection lodged in one of the member states. 
European Data Protection Supervisor: The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) is an independent 
institution of the EU, responsible under Article 41(2) of Regulation 45/2001 ‘With respect to the processing 
of personal data… for ensuring that the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular 
their right to privacy, are respected by the Community institutions and bodies’, and ‘…for advising 
Community institutions and bodies and data subjects on all matters concerning the processing of personal 
data’. Under Article 28(2) of Regulation 45/2001, the Commission is required, ‘when adopting a legislative 
Proposal relating to the protection of individuals’ rights and freedoms with regard to the processing of 
personal data...’, to consult the EDPS.  
Entry-Exit System: the Entry/Exit System (EES) is a system to register entry and exit data and refusal of entry 
data of third country nationals crossing the external borders of the Member States of the European Union 
and determining the conditions for access to the EES for law enforcement purposes.  
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): On 4 May 2016, the official text of the Regulation has been 
published in the EU Official Journal in all the official languages. The Regulation will enter into force on 24 May 
2016. The objective of this new set of rules is to give citizens back control over of their personal data, and to 
simplify the regulatory environment for business. The data protection reform is a key enabler of the Digital 
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Single Market which the Commission has prioritised. The reform will allow European citizens and businesses 
to fully benefit from the digital economy. 
Personal data: Article 4(1) of the GDPR defines “personal data” as any information relating to an identified 
or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, 
directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, 
location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, 
mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person.  
Processing:  Article 4(14) of the GDPR defines “processing” as any operation or set of operations which is 
performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as 
collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, 
disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, 
restriction, erasure or destruction. 
Schengen Area: The Schengen Area is one of the greatest achievements of the EU. It is an area without 
internal borders, an area within which citizens, many non-EU nationals, business people and tourists can 
freely circulate without being subjected to border checks. Since 1985, it has gradually grown and 
encompasses today almost all EU States and a few associated non-EU countries. While having abolished their 
internal borders, Schengen States have also tightened controls at their common external border on the basis 
of Schengen rules to ensure the security of those living or travelling in the Schengen Area. 
Schengen Border Code: The Schengen Borders Code governs the crossing of the external border, facilitating 
access for those who have a legitimate interest to enter into the EU. A special Local Border Traffic Regime 
has also been established to facilitate entry for non-EU border residents who frequently need to cross the 
EU external border. A common visa policy further facilitates the entry of legal visitors into the EU. 
Sensitive personal data: Article 9(1) of the GDPR defines “sensitive personal” data as personal data revealing 
racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and 
the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data 
concerning health or data concerning a natural person's sex life or sexual orientation. 
Schengen Information System: The Schengen Information System (SIS) is a highly efficient large-scale 
information system that supports external border control and law enforcement cooperation in the Schengen 
States. The SIS enables competent authorities, such as police and border guards, to enter and consult alerts 
on certain categories of wanted or missing persons and objects. An SIS alert not only contains information 
about a particular person or object but also clear instructions on what to do when the person or object has 
been found. Specialised national SIRENE Bureaux serve as single points of contact for any supplementary 
information exchange and coordination of activities related to SIS alerts.  
Self-service system: means an automated system which performs all or some of the border checks that are 
applicable to a person 
Template: a biometric template is a digital representation of the unique features that have been extracted 
from a biometric sample.  
Visa Information System (VIS): The Visa Information System (VIS) allows Schengen States to exchange visa 
data. It consists of a central IT system and of a communication infrastructure that links this central system to 
national systems. VIS connects consulates in non-EU countries and all external border crossing points of 
Schengen States. It processes data and decisions relating to applications for short-stay visas to visit, or to 
transit through, the Schengen Area. The system can perform biometric matching, primarily of fingerprints, 
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1 Introduction 
The PROTECT concept has been designed to develop a multimodal biometric solution for identity 
confirmation “on the move” of travellers, with the aim to facilitate the Schengen Area external cross-border 
movements. The system should, therefore, process various “emerging” biometric modalities which could be 
processed in a contactless way. For the purposes of multimodal biometric ID verification, project partners 
proposed to design and develop a biometric corridor, which would incorporate a number of biometric 
sensors. The initial plan was to include such biometrics as: face recognition, iris recognition, vein pattern 
recognition, speaker recognition as well as anthropometric recognition. When operational, the beneficiaries 
of the multimodal biometric system being developed within the PROTECT project should be persons enjoying 
the Union right of free movement as well as third country nationals. 
A critical issue with biometrics arises with the collection of biometric data, which could be construed as being 
in conflict with fundamental human rights such as the right of liberty and the rights to privacy and data 
protection. Since greater use of personal data impacts upon human rights, there needs to be an honest and 
assertive study of what the risks are to privacy and how these risks are mitigated and balanced by improving 
the travel experience and security of the citizen. Therefore, critical evaluations of the biometric person 
identification system from a privacy point of view, investigations of social acceptability, and contributions to 
European legal frameworks are integral parts of the PROTECT project. 
In order to ensure that ethical and legal aspects are thoroughly investigated and addressed within the 
PROTECT project, a specific work package –  “WP2 Privacy” – is dedicated  to explore the privacy issues raised 
by the PROTECT system, translate those issues into operational requirements usable for the system designers 
and assess the privacy compliance of the technological constructs. In this WP2: 
 Ethical and legal experts at UNAMUR study the legal frameworks, conduct acceptability studies 
of different biometric solutions and examine ethical and privacy issues related to the PROTECT 
system; 
 An Ethical & Legal Advisory Group (ELAG), consisting of three independent experts with extensive 
experience in privacy or biometrics and identity management issues, independently monitor and 
review the activities and outputs of the project. 
1.1 Purpose of the document 
This document is deliverable D2.5 (version 1) – “Societal impact report” of Task T2.5 within WP2 – “Privacy” 
of the PROTECT project. The aim of D2.5 is to identify and address the ethical and legal implications of the 
technical solutions being developed in the context of the PROTECT project by summarizing discussions 
between the project partners and exchanges with the Ethical and Legal Advisory Group (ELAG) as well as with 
other external experts. 
1.2 Document scope 
The document consists of an introduction and three main sections: 
 Section 2 provides for an overview of the presentation given by UNAMUR at the meeting “on the 
impact of privacy regulations on system architecture & technical solutions” which was organized on 
4th July 2017 at the University of Reading. The purpose of this meeting was to present to the 
PROTECT partners the implications of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) on the 
processing of biometric data in the context of border control; 
 Section 3 contains a summary of the discussions held during the first ELAG meeting which took place 
at the University of Reading on July 5th 2017. The objective of that meeting was to discuss the ethical 
and legal implications of a potential scenario implementing the PROTECT solution taking into account 
existing and forthcoming EU regulations in the field of border control and data protection;   
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 Section 4 contains a summary of the discussions held at the PROTECT panel at the 11th International 
conference on computers, privacy and data protection (CPDP2018) organized by UNAMUR and which 
took place on January 25th in Brussels. This panel was entitled “privacy and data protection issues 
related to the use of contactless multimodal biometrics at border-crossings” and was the opportunity 
to share some views with important actors such as the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) 
and the JHA Counsellor at the Permanent Representation of Finland to the EU. 
 
2 Meeting on the impact of privacy regulations on system 
architecture & technical solutions 
2.1 Introduction 
This meeting “on the impact of privacy regulations on system architecture & technical solutions” was 
organized on 4th July 2017 at the University of Reading in the context of Task 5.6. This task explicitly examines 
the design and implementation of privacy enhancing technology. In order to complete the first stage of this 
task, this meeting was organized in order to present to the consortium members the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) and impacts on sensors, data processing and system architecture. On 4 May 2016, the 
official text of the GDPR has been published in the EU Official Journal and shall apply from 25 May 2018.  
The points covered by Franck Dumortier (UNAMUR) in this introduction to the GDPR to the consortium 
members were:  
 What aspects are covered by the GDPR? 
 How does it relate to national law?  
 How does it affect European citizens compared to registered traveller programs? 
 How much can be covered by consent forms? 
 Which biometric modalities have to be protected?  
2.2 Presentation  
It was first recalled that the GDPR is a Regulation.  A "regulation" is a binding legislative act. It must be applied 
in its entirety across the EU and even beyond. 
Indeed, according to the GDPR, “1. This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data in the context 
of the activities of an establishment of a controller or a processor in the Union, regardless of whether the 
processing takes place in the Union or not. 2. This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data of 
data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union, where the 
processing activities are related to: (a) the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a payment of 
the data subject is required, to such data subjects in the Union; or (b) the monitoring of their behaviour as far 
as their behaviour takes place within the Union. 3. This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data 
by a controller not established in the Union, but in a place where Member State law applies by virtue of public 
international law.” 
In principle, the objective is complete harmonization but the GDPR leaves scope for divergences between MS 
in a number of areas including in the field of conditions for processing of biometric data.  
The GDPR applies when there is: “processing” of “personal data” wholly or partly by automatic means or 
(organized manually in a filing system). However, the GDPR does not apply to processing of personal data by 
a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity. This being said, the processing of 
personal data in the context of border-crossing cannot be considered as a purely personal or household 
activity: hence the GDPR applies. 
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Important definitions of the GDPR were then recalled: 
 Personal data is defined in art. 4 of the GDPR as “any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be 
identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an 
identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the 
physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person”. 
This definition takes into account evolutions of technology and must be interpreted in a very broad 
way. Indeed, Recital 26 of the GDPR states that: “To determine whether a natural person is 
identifiable, account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used, such as singling 
out, either by the controller or by another person to identify the natural person directly or indirectly. 
To ascertain whether means are reasonably likely to be used to identify the natural person, account 
should be taken of all objective factors, such as the costs of and the amount of time required for 
identification, taking into consideration the available technology at the time of the processing and 
technological developments”. Recital 30 also confirm this broad interpretation by stating that: 
“Natural persons may be associated with online identifiers provided by their devices, applications, 
tools and protocols, such as internet protocol addresses, cookie identifiers or other identifiers such 
as radio frequency identification tags. This may leave traces which, in particular when combined with 
unique identifiers and other information received by the servers, may be used to create profiles of 
the natural persons and identify them”. 
 Article 4 (14) of the GDPR defines “biometric data” as “personal data resulting from specific technical 
processing relating to the physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of a natural person, 
which allow or confirm the unique identification of that natural person, such as facial images or 
dactyloscopic data”. Opinion 4/2007 (WP136) of the Article 29 Working Party clarifies that “even if 
the patterns used in practice to technically measure them involve a certain degree of probability”, 
“templates” are considered as being “biometric data”.  
 “Processing” is defined in art. 4(2) of the GDPR as “any operation or set of operations which is 
performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic means such as collection, recording, 
organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by means of 
transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, 
erasure or destruction of personal data”. Even anonymization or erasure of personal data must be 
considered as a “processing”.  
 “Controller” is defined in art. 4(7) of the GDPR as “the natural or legal person, public authority, 
agency or other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the 
processing of personal data; where the purposes and means of such processing are determined by 
Union or Member State law, the controller or the specific criteria for its nomination may be provided 
for by Union or Member State law”. In the frame of the project, we should distinguish contexts of 
“project demonstrations” (controller = the PROTECT consortium/members) & “real life” (controller 
= a company or authority determined by Union or MS law).  
 “Processor” is defined in art.4(8) of the GDPR: “a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or 
other body which processes personal data on behalf of the controller. Here again, depending on the 
actual implementation of the system, we should distinguish contexts of “project demonstrations” 
(processors = the PROTECT members) & “real life” (processor = authority or company determined by 
the data controller).  
Franck Dumortier then discussed the legal basis for processing of biometric data under the GDPR in the 
border control context. He recalled the principle of Article 9 of the GDPR according to which “processing 
of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or 
trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely 
identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural person's sex life or 
sexual orientation shall be prohibited”. He also reminded Recital 51 of the GDPR according to which 
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“Such personal data should not be processed, unless processing is allowed in specific cases set out in this 
Regulation, taking into account that Member States law may lay down specific provisions on data 
protection in order to adapt the application of the rules of this Regulation for compliance with a legal 
obligation or for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official 
authority vested in the controller. In addition to the specific requirements for such processing, the 
general principles and other rules of this Regulation should apply, in particular as regards the conditions 
for lawful processing. Derogations from the general prohibition for processing such special categories of 
personal data should be explicitly provided, inter alia, where the data subject gives his or her explicit 
consent or in respect of specific needs in particular where the processing is carried out in the course of 
legitimate activities by certain associations or foundations the purpose of which is to permit the exercise 
of fundamental freedoms”. 
By consequence, exceptions to the prohibition of processing biometric data in the context of the 
PROTECT project are only possible when:  
 the data subject has given explicit consent to the processing of those personal data for one or 
more specified purposes, except where Union or Member State law provide that the prohibition 
may not be lifted by the data subject; 
 processing is necessary for reasons of substantial public interest, on the basis of Union or 
Member State law which shall be proportionate to the aim pursued, respect the essence of the 
right to data protection and provide for suitable and specific measures to safeguard the 
fundamental rights and the interests of the data subject; 
 processing is necessary for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical 
research purposes or statistical purposes. 
It was also recalled that Member States may maintain or introduce further conditions, including limitations, 
with regard to the processing of biometric data. This means that even if based on consent, we have to take 
into account mandatory requirements of Union or Member State law in the context of PROTECT.  
The first legal basis which was analysed for processing biometrics in the context of PROTECT was consent of 
the travellers. Consent” is defined in art. 4(11) of the GDP as “any freely given, specific, informed and 
unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear 
affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her”. Additionally, 
for biometric data, consent must be “explicit”. Furthermore, according to the GDPR, conditions for consent 
are the following:  
“1.   Where processing is based on consent, the controller shall be able to demonstrate that the data subject 
has consented to processing of his or her personal data. 2.   If the data subject's consent is given in the context 
of a written declaration which also concerns other matters, the request for consent shall be presented in a 
manner which is clearly distinguishable from the other matters, in an intelligible and easily accessible form, 
using clear and plain language. Any part of such a declaration which constitutes an infringement of this 
Regulation shall not be binding. 3.   The data subject shall have the right to withdraw his or her consent at 
any time. The withdrawal of consent shall not affect the lawfulness of processing based on consent before 
its withdrawal. Prior to giving consent, the data subject shall be informed thereof. It shall be as easy to 
withdraw as to give consent. 4.   When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be 
taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional 
on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that contract”.  
When applied to biometrics, the Article Working Party 29 considers renewability and revocability of consent 
as essential by stating that “Biometric systems should be designed in a way that allows to revoke the identity 
link, either in order to renew it or to permanently delete it e.g. when the consent is revoked”. Franck also 
stressed that Recital 43 expressly states that: “in order to ensure that consent is freely given, consent should 
not provide a valid legal ground for the processing of personal data in a specific case where there is a clear 
imbalance between the data subject and the controller, in particular where the controller is a public authority 
and it is therefore unlikely that consent was freely given in all the circumstances of that specific situation”. 
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This means that consent of travellers could not be used by public border control authorities to speed up 
their public interest missions.  
This being said, consent would still be a possible legal basis for “commercial” purposes. For example, in a 
2005 deliberation, the CNIL (French DPA) authorized the use of fingerprints on a fidelity chipcard for frequent 
travellers of the airport of Nice. The system was designed for convenience purposes (facilitate access to 
parking zones, additional services, etc): Important criteria were the 1) the voluntary use, and 2) the storage 
on an object (no centralized database). 
The second legal basis which was analysed for the processing of biometric data in the context of border 
control was Art. 8(d) of Regulation (EU) 2017/2225 (amending the Schengen Borders Code) which allows MS 
to legislate on voluntary “National Facilitation Programs” (NFPs). It was recalled that the purpose of such 
NFPs was only to allow pre-vetted and pre-cleared third country nationals (TCNs) to waive them from the 
requirement to be subject to an interview on their means of subsistence, purpose of travel and point of 
departure and destination.  This means two important things in the context of PROTECT: 1) this legal basis 
could not be used for EU/EEA/CH travellers; 2) for TCNs it could only be used to “facilitate” the requirements 
of interview on their means of subsistence, purpose of travel and point of departure and destination as the 
purpose of NFPs is not to “speed up border control databases checks”. Indeed, SIS, VIS and EES will still have 
to be checked on the basis of “traditional” biometrics (as legally standardized).  
Thirdly, it was mentioned that the processing of additional biometric data in the context of the PROTECT 
project was of course possible because it is “necessary for scientific purposes”. That is why consent forms 
have been prepared in D2.1 for volunteers willing to participate in our demonstrations.  
Finally, after having analysed these legal bases for additional biometric processing in the context of border 
control, Franck Dumortier applied the core data protection principles to biometrics. These principles are 
enshrined in article 5 of the GDPR which states that personal data shall be:  
 processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner; 
 collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that 
is incompatible with those purposes (‘purpose limitation’); 
 adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are 
processed (‘data minimisation’); 
 accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable step must be taken to ensure that 
personal data that are inaccurate, having regard to the purposes for which they are processed, are 
erased or rectified without delay (‘accuracy’); 
 kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the 
purposes for which the personal data are processed (‘storage limitation’); 
 processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of the personal data, including protection 
against unauthorised or unlawful processing and against accidental loss, destruction or damage, 
using appropriate technical or organisational measures (‘integrity and confidentiality’). 
When applying these principles to the processing of biometric data, it was recalled that the Article 29 Working 
Party considers that:  
 Biometric data may only be used if adequate, relevant and not excessive. It implies a strict 
assessment of the necessity and proportionality of the processed data and if the intended purpose 
could be achieved in a less intrusive way. If the benefit is relatively minor, such as an increase in 
convenience or a slight cost saving, then the loss of privacy is not appropriate. 
 Decentralized storage is preferred to centralized databases. It is advisable that biometric systems are 
based on the reading of biometric data stored as encrypted templates on media that are held 
exclusively by the relevant data subjects (e.g. smart cards or similar devices). Their biometric features 
can be compared with the template(s) stored on the card and/or device by means of standard 
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comparison procedures that are implemented directly on the card and/or device in question, 
whereby the creation of a database including biometric information should be, in general and if 
possible, avoided. 
 Biometric data should be stored as biometric templates whenever that is possible. Template should 
be extracted in a way that is specific to that biometric system and not used by other controllers of 
similar systems in order to make sure that a person can only be identified in those biometric systems 
that have a legal basis for this operation. 
 The definition of the size (the quantity of information) of the template is a crucial issue. On the one 
hand, the size of the template should be wide enough to manage security (avoiding overlaps between 
different biometric data, or identity substitutions). On the other hand, the size of the template should 
not be too large in order to avoid the risks of biometric data reconstruction.  
 The generation of the template should be a one-way process, in that it should not be possible to 
regenerate the raw biometric data from the template. 
 To maintain the reliability of a biometric system and prevent identity fraud, the manufacturer has to 
implement systems aiming to determine if the biometric data is both genuine and still connected to 
a natural person. In respect of facial recognition, it may be critical to ensure that the face is a real 
one and not, for example, a picture tied on an impostor’s head. 
 In order to prevent that biometric information are stored for longer than is necessary for the 
purposes for which they were collected or subsequently processed, appropriate automated data 
erasure mechanisms have to be implemented also in case the retention period may be lawfully 
extended, assuring the timely deletion of personal data that become unnecessary for the operation 
of the biometric system. 
 The biometric system used and the security measures chosen should limit the mentioned risks and 
make sure that the re-use of the biometric data in question for further purposes is impossible or at 
least traceable. Mechanisms based on cryptographic technologies, in order to prevent the 
unauthorised reading, copying, modification or removal of biometric data should be used. When the 
biometric data are stored on a device that the data subject physically controls, a specific encryption 
key for the reader devices should be used as an effective safeguard to protect these data from 
unauthorised access. 
3 First Ethical & Legal Advisory Group meeting in Reading  
3.1 Introduction 
The Ethical & Legal Advisory Group (ELAG) consists of three independent experts in ethical and legal issues 
with extensive experience in privacy or biometrics and identity management issues. The presence of an 
ethical board of independent experts is meant to exert a permanent call to also consider and care about the 
ethical and social acceptability of the PROTECT conduct and outputs. The 3 experts are: 
 Gloria Gonzalez Fuster (VUB), who is a research professor at VUB, where she investigates legal issues 
related to fundamental rights, privacy, personal data protection and security, and lectures on 
fundamental rights protection in European Union (EU) law in the context of the Master of Laws in 
International and European Law (PILC). 
 Diana Dimitrova (FIS Karlsruhe), who was a legal researcher for 3.5 years at the law faculty of the 
University of Leuven (KUL) in Belgium. Her research focuses mainly on privacy and data protection, 
especially in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. She carried out her research in the framework 
of the FastPass and eVACUATE projects at KUL. In 2012 she completed a five-month traineeship at 
the Supervision and Enforcement Unit of the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) in Brussels 
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and holds an LLM in European Law from the University of Leiden, NL. At FIZ Karlsruhe Diana works 
for the EU project STARR. 
 Monica Vilasau Solana (UOC) is Lecturer in the Law and Political Science Department at Universitat 
Oberta de Catalunya and expert in data protection law.  
The 3 experts have been invited to participate to a first ELAG meeting that which took place at University of 
Reading on July 5th 2017. The objective of that meeting was to discuss the following scenario:  
1. A registered traveller would be issued a token in the form of a machine-readable smartphone 
application containing a unique multimodal biometric template, which is swiped on arrival and 
departure at the border using a self-service system.  
2. The self-service system would read the token and the travel document (and residence 
card/permit/visa, if applicable). The face (and if applicable fingerprints) of the travel document(s) 
would be compared to the ones stored in EU and national databases, including the SIS (and EES/VIS 
if applicable).  
3. After having walked through the PROTECT Biometric Capture Area, if all checks in the databases are 
successful, and if he is biometrically authentified, the traveller is able to pass through the automated 
gate. 
This scenario was presented to the three experts by Franck Dumortier and discussed within the ELAG in the 
presence of Frank Schmalz (VERIDOS) to confront this technical scenario with legal and societal concerns.  
 
 
Figure 1 - Frank Schmalz answering ELAG's questions 
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3.2 Discussion  
Franck Dumortier started the ELAG session by recalling that PROTECT is a research project which has to 
enquire on the potential of implementing contactless multimodal biometrics at external border crossing 
points. This objective was stated by the European Commission, which expressed it as follows in the H2020 
call “BES-6-2015: Border crossing points, topic 2: Exploring new modalities in biometric-based border 
checks”: “Research is needed in order to explore whether it is possible to use other biometric data (potentially 
already used in another context and in another domain) than fingerprint, iris or facial picture to store in the 
e-Passport chip, which would guarantee the same or higher level of security, but would be more accurate and 
could be retrieved in a more efficient manner than in the case of the conventionally used biometric data types. 
In addition, practical experiences lead to the assumption that for non-critical travellers (EU, bona-fide etc.) a 
most fluent non-intrusive control process is desired. Therefore, to increase accuracy, in this case the use of 
contactless techniques (e.g. face, 3D face, iris) and multi-biometric fusion is likely to be preferred over contact-
based technologies”. 
When keeping this general objective in mind while taking into account current border control and privacy 
legislation, consortium partners decided to imagine three different types of scenarios for PROTECT’s 
solutions: 
1) A model where the PROTECT scenario is fully compliant with existing and forthcoming EU 
legislation and standards (model 1); 
2) A model where the scenario is partly compliant with Schengen border-crossing legislation, but 
entirely compliant with data protection requirements set by the GDPR as these are human rights 
requirements (model 2); 
3) A model where the scenario is directed entirely towards technical possibility and border control 
effectiveness, anticipates future business conditions and is less compliant than models 1 and 2 
above and requires substantial work to satisfy legal opinion of its future legality (model 3 to be 
analysed by UNAMUR in D2.3). 
Franck Dumortier then explained that during this first ELAG session, it was decided to discuss a potential fully 
legally compliant (“model 1”) scenario taking into account the following 3 types of legal constraints.  
First, several constraints derived from current EU rules on ePassports and residence permits should be taken 
into account:  
1) It is important to note that Article 4 of Regulation EC 2252/2004 stipulates that “No information in 
machine-readable form shall be included in a passport or travel document unless provided for in this 
Regulation, or its Annex, or unless it is mentioned in the passport or travel document by the issuing Member 
State in accordance with its national legislation”. To be pragmatic, this means that under current EU law, it 
is very unlikely that inclusion of additional multimodal biometrics features (being not facial image or 
fingerprints) developed within the PROTECT project could legally be integrated in ePassports. Consent of 
travellers does not permit to do so. Furthermore, even if an EU Member State would adopt national 
legislation regulating such integration, it would be easily challenged for privacy and data protection issues. 
2) It is important to note that article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 1030/2002 as amended by Regulation (EC) No 
380/2008 provides that “No information in machine-readable form shall be included on the resident permit 
or on the storage medium of the residence permit referred to in Article 4a, unless provided for in this 
Regulation, or its Annex or unless it is mentioned in the related travel document by the issuing State in 
accordance with its national legislation. Member States may also store data for e-services such as e-
government and e-business as well as additional provisions relating to the residence permit on a chip referred 
to in point 16 of the Annex. However, all national data must be logically separated from the biometric data 
referred to in Article 4a”. Point 16 of the annex clarifies that “a RF chip shall be used as a storage medium in 
accordance with Article 4a. Member States may store data on this chip or incorporate in the residence permit 
a dual interface or a separate contact chip for national use which shall be placed at the back of the card 
complying with ISO standards and shall in no way interfere with the RF chip”. The possibility and conditions 
Deliverable D2.5v1 PROTECT H2020 Project No. 700259 
 Page 17 of 56 
 
for national legislation to rely on this legal basis in order to integrate additional multimodal biometrics data 
on a “second” chip of residence permits in the context of the establishment of a voluntary “national 
facilitation program” (based on consent of TCNs) will be analysed into D2.3 – Privacy impact of next-
generation biometric border control. 
3) Under current EU law, it also seems very doubtful that mobile devices such as smartphones could legally 
be used as carriers of biometrics features as means to replace the materials imposed by the annex of 
Regulation EC 2252/2004 and Regulation EC 1030/2002: smartphones cannot be considered as “Passports or 
travel documents” in the meaning of article 1 of said Regulations. Nonetheless, for research purposes, this 
constraint does not oppose to carefully examining the possibility of deriving a “virtual mobile identity” by 
combining data already present in ePassports or residence permits with additional multimodal biometric 
features developed within PROTECT and securely loaded onto a mobile device, such as a phone, a wearable, 
or a token.  
A second important set of constraints derive from the fact that, depending on the case, travellers must be 
checked against SIS II/ VIS/EES on the basis of “traditional” biometrics which are fingerprints and facial image. 
Therefore, the scenario that was submitted to the ELAG envisages to combine the use of these “traditional” 
biometrics with the “additional ones” being developed within PROTECT for the purpose of verification of 
travellers against the above-mentioned IT databases. 
A third set of important legal constraints derive from privacy and data protection regulations which general 
principles are currently mainly enshrined into the GDPR.  
Gloria Gonzalez Fuster had the feeling that lots of scenarios were still discussed within the PROTECT 
consortium and reminded that checking which of the scenarios are possible according to current legislation 
is of first importance in the context of European research security projects such as PROTECT. She understood 
that the scenario that we were discussing would be one of the scenarios that fits better the scientific question 
but had the strange feeling that PROTECT partners still had different views on the objectives to reach. 
Frank Schmalz answered that basically in the PROTECT project, partners are of course discussing a lot of 
scenarios and course checking which of the scenarios are possible according to current legislation. The one 
that was presented to the ELAG is one possible scenario which fits better our scientific question while being 
legally compliant. Frank also reminded that multiple objectives are pursued within the PROTECT project:  
− one is to have faster biometrics crossing points by improving performance in the control process by 
using contactless biometrics;  
− the other aspect is to use additional biometrics to improve accuracy and speed, and make the process 
more convenient for the travellers.  
Gloria asked how and when concretely the information of the passport (and the traditional biometrics 
contained therein) would be “mixed” with the additional ones being developed within the PROTECT project.  
Frank Schmalz answered that in a certain way we would have to link the additional biometrics to the person 
and one manner to do that is by issuing a token. One possibility would be to use information that is stored 
inside the passport and this would be signed together with the additional biometric templates and then 
stored on a smartphone. So later, we could read the information from the phone, decrypt it, and use this 
identifier to link the information to the identity the person. Indeed, during the verification biometric 
matching itself, it would not make sense to identify a person without knowing which person we are 
identifying.  
Gloria asked if passport information would be stored inside the smartphone in this scenario. Frank Schmalz 
answered that basically this information could, for example, be a hash of the information that is stored within 
the passport. It is then not passport information that is stored on the phone but a link to the passport. This 
would be a suitable solution in Frank Schmalz’s opinion.  
Diana Dimitrova then asked if during the biometric matching phase against the EU IT databases, the 
consortium was planning to use both the passport and the smartphone of travellers or only the smartphone 
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which would contain the passport’s information. By asking this question, Diana recalled that the information 
stored on the passports was officially needed to carry out all of the background checks.  
Frank Schmalz answered Diana by saying that in the normative scenario (“model 1”) we are discussing, we 
would need both the passport (for background checks based on traditional biometrics) and the phone to 
carry additional biometrics. The reason therefore is that under the current legal situation we cannot install 
the additional biometrics in the passport because this document is very strictly regulated. So we need to use 
another data carrier for additional biometrics which could be a smartphone. But later on, if doing so, when 
checking information in the smartphone, we will need to make the connection between the person and the 
information in the smartphone. The reason therefore is that additional biometrics is useless if you just 
recognize someone you don’t know who he is. So, storing a hash of passport information in the smartphone 
to make the link between both carriers would be a possibility.  
Monica Vilasau Solana asked Frank Schmalz some additional information about the linking process that was 
happening in the smartphone. Frank explained that during the enrolment phase of the additional biometrics 
being developed within PROTECT, we will have to make the link to the person. In the passport, which is a 
booklet, alphanumerical data is stored but also facial image and fingerprints. On the other hand, we have 
PROTECT’s additional biometrics. What we could do is extract the biometric templates from the passport, 
encrypt them and calculate some hash of it to obtain a unique identifier of the information contained within 
the passport’s chip. This identifier could only be retrieved when the passport is read out. So, this is not an 
official document number, but a new unique token specific to the passport.  Franck Dumortier added that in 
such a scenario it would be impossible to reconstruct the information which is stored in the passport with 
the hash but only to use this hash for a linking purpose between both data carriers.  
Frank Schmalz continued by explaining that this hash and the templates of the additional biometrics would 
then be stored together on the traveller’s smartphone. A digital signature would also be needed to make a 
strong connection between both kinds of information when these are retrieved. When arriving to the kiosk, 
the traveller presents his passport, the information can be extracted, the hash can be calculated and the 
smartphone is transferring its data as well. It is then possible to make the link again between the information 
stored in both data carriers.  
Monica Vilasau Solana asked for additional information about when exactly the passport hash would be 
calculated. Frank Schmalz answered that this would happen during the enrolment phase. Franck Dumortier 
added that the data controller of such a system would probably be a company or authority, that the traveller 
would have to sign a consent form to use the “facilitation” service and that after this, additional biometrics 
would be enrolled together with a hash of the passport being calculated at that precise moment. All this 
information would be packed together in an encrypted form and stored in the traveller’s smartphone. Monica 
then asked if this identification hash (or token) would still be unique for each enrolling traveller. Frank 
confirmed that this hash would be unique to each traveller. Monica asked if this unique identification number 
would be stored only in the smartphone. Frank again answered positively. Diana asked whether it would be 
possible to identify the exact passport of a traveller just by reading the hash. Frank answered that the hash 
function is a one-way process and that the link could only be retrieved when the passport is read. This also 
makes sense because usually you get a new passport at least every 10 years because your biometrics change. 
This is also true for additional biometrics: these also change with time. So, it makes sense that if you need a 
new travel document, you also would need to enrol the additional PROTECT’s biometrics.  
Gloria Gonzalez Fuster asked Frank some additional information about the process that would happen when 
the traveller is passing through the corridor. Frank answered that the main objective of PROTECT in this 
scenario was to make the connection with a passport but not to verify the authenticity of a passport (which 
can be done by the actual border control system). Gloria asked if in the corridor (or e-gate), the biometric 
match for passport authentication would be a parallel process with the additional biometric matching for 
identity confirmation, or whether the same token would be attributed to the two processes. Diana clarified 
this question by asking exactly which checks are performed when the traveller was passing through the 
corridor. Is it 1) to verify that the biometrics of the person walking through the corridor corresponds to the 
ones in the passport or 2) to verify that the biometrics stored on the smartphone correspond to the ones of 
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the person or 3) both? Frank Schmalz answered that both were performed but clarified that the first check 
was started at the kiosk and that sensors in the corridor would perform the second checks. In the corridor 
we would have different sensors like a face camera and iris recognition, and both kinds of biometrics could 
be checked against the ones stored in the smartphone.  
Diana Dimitrova questioned the purpose of enrolling/check additional biometrics if the goal is to gain speed 
during the border control process. Frank answered that the main technical challenge of the PROTECT project 
was to demonstrate enough quality of biometrics when processing them “on the move”. If a traveller stands 
still and looks into a camera, you get far better matching results than if the traveller is moving. So, if you add 
additional biometrics you can be more confident that the person is the one to be identified when walking. 
Gloria commented that if the purpose of the system is to do checks on travellers while they move to win a 
couple of seconds but they still have to go to a place and cue for enrolling additional biometrics, there is no 
real overall speed increase. Frank answered that this really depends on how often a traveller is crossing the 
borders in comparison with the time taken for the enrolment phase. Gloria acknowledged that for a small 
minority of travellers this would make some sense.  
Gloria asked if the token which is assigned to a traveller at the kiosk would be stored for a little time when 
he’s travelling through the corridor, and if so, for how long. Frank answered that once the verification had 
been done, it would be destroyed. This automatic erasure feature has been implemented in the PROTECT 
architecture concept. Gloria was happy to hear that no data was retained.  
Frank Schmalz continued to explain that, after the background checks processes in databases (depending on 
the case: SIS/VIS/EES) have been started when the passport is read at the kiosk, when a traveller is passing 
through the Biometric Capture Area, sensors such as face recognition or iris recognition cameras could 
continue to identify him thanks to the additional biometrics stored in the phone.  
Frank Schmalz stressed again that the purpose of the PROTECT project is not to change the strictly regulated 
background checks processes in EU border databases but to try to improve the quality of the matching by 
developing additional biometrics on-the-move to increase the speed with which people can walk to the gate 
while background checks are being performed. In this scenario, some speed can be gained by reducing the 
bottleneck at e-gates (which process information slowly with people standing still) by starting the background 
checks at the kiosks and being able to subsequently track travellers while they are walking to the gates, using 
the additional biometrics stored in their phones. While the travellers are walking through the corridor, border 
guards can then get information about which people have to be checked more thoroughly and which not.  
In this scenario, a traveller has both a biometric passport and an app on his smartphone (with the hash and 
the additional biometrics fused), and the system verifies that 1) the owner of the passport is lawful  (thus 
verifying that the face of the owner matches the facial image in the passport) and 2) whether the additional 
biometrics such as iris, anthropometrics of the traveller match the templates stored in the smartphone. In 
view of this, Diana Dimitrova asked what would happen if the biometric verification against the passport was 
successful but not the one against the templates stored into the smartphone. What would the border guard 
do in this case? Frank answered that if we have a positive match against the face on-the-move in the 
Biometric Capture Area, we wouldn’t need to look at the other biometrics. He explained that in the biometric 
field, you never have a 1 or 0 decision but a decision based on 1) image quality and 2) matching quality. The 
goal is only to make a statement on the likeliness that someone is the same person: it's not a 100% match 
objective. According to Frank, the situation described by Diana already happens in the current E-gate 
situation. For example, a traveller with a beard could not always be successfully identified at E-gates and 
border guards would already need to perform additional checks manually to identify the person. In our 
proposed scenario, Frank said that the quality of biometric facial recognition “on-the-move” is lower as you 
cannot get as good images than when travellers are standing still. So the goal of additional biometrics is also 
give some confidence that if the score of one biometric matching is low but other are high, you can make the 
statement that, given the combination of the results, it's very unlikely that someone is able to forge two, 
three or four biometric features at the same time. In this case, the border guard could take the decision to 
let the traveller pass through.  
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Diana Dimitrova still raised the question of the legal ground that could allow a border guard to take a negative 
decision or to perform more thorough checks on the basis of additional biometrics if the facial matching 
against the passport did not raise any suspicion. According to her, this scenario would create a new identity 
check which falls outside the law. Gloria commented that according to her, the purpose of these additional 
biometrics would be to assist border guards in their decisions in case of doubt, which is what they already do 
manually in the current situation without the help of such technology. Frank added that if the face match is 
perfect and accepted because it's beyond the threshold, the system will consider the traveller as being 
trustworthy and there would be no reason for border guards to consider the additional biometric features.  
Diana did not agree with that explanation. She asked what would happen if a traveller passes the facial 1 to 
1 check against his passport but fails the second one which is on the move and based on different biometrics 
to the passport ones. Could a border guard stop the traveller who passed all checks required by law only by 
a decision taken on the basis of additional biometrics? Frank answered that, indeed, there is no legal ground 
for such a decision by a border guard. Frank added that the scenario looked it the other way around and was 
focussing on the case where there is dubitable face matching and additional biometrics would be used to 
assist the border guards to deal with those doubts. In this case, there is a legal ground for border guards to 
perform additional checks. Gloria commented that in this “on-the-move” scenario, the face image matching 
would be of lower quality and that hence additional biometrics would often have to be checked by border 
guards to deal with doubts. For this reason, Gloria did not see the absolute necessity (in regard to travellers’ 
right to privacy) to design a border control system on-the-move since it would de facto generate more 
intrusive checks and process more personal data. Frank recalled that the potential of implementing on-the-
move border crossing points was the objective pursued by PROTECT answering the European Commission 
H2020 call “BES-6-2015: Border crossing points, topic 2: Exploring new modalities in biometric-based border 
checks”, which is described as follows:   
“Research is needed in order to explore whether it is possible to use other biometric data (potentially already 
used in another context and in another domain) than fingerprint, iris or facial picture to store in the e-Passport 
chip, which would guarantee the same or higher level of security, but would be more accurate and could be 
retrieved in a more efficient manner than in the case of the conventionally used biometric data types. In 
addition, practical experiences lead to the assumption that for non-critical travellers (EU, bona-fide etc.) a 
most fluent non-intrusive control process is desired. Therefore, to increase accuracy, in this case the use of 
contactless techniques (e.g. face, 3D face, iris) and multi-biometric fusion is likely to be preferred over contact-
based technologies”. 
Monica Vilasau asked why the PROTECT consortium was not considering only processing the iris of 
passengers since it is a more reliable feature than the facial image. Frank answered that indeed iris is better 
than face but that we cannot get rid of face for legal reasons we discussed before. Monica Vilasau referred 
to the principle of data minimization, which requires that processing of personal data is limited to what is 
necessary for purposes for which they are collected. Frank answered that in the current legal environment, 
background checks must be based on face and cannot be realized on the basis of iris. Frank Schmalz also 
reminded that we were not talking in this ELAG meeting about the most performant scenario, but about one 
that was imagined to cope with the current legal constraints.  
The last question that was discussed with the ELAG was whether consent of travellers could be a legal ground 
to process additional biometric data to speed up the travellers’ experience. Concretely, in this scenario, 
consent would be asked of the traveller by asking him to press a button in his app and a dialogue box would 
appear. This would comply with the explicit and informed consent requirements from the GDPR. From the 
legal perspective, the ELAG members recalled that the GDPR requires consent to be freely given and that 
Recital 43 of the GDPR explicitly states that: “in order to ensure that consent is freely given, consent should 
not provide a valid legal ground for the processing of personal data in a specific case where there is a clear 
imbalance between the data subject and the controller, in particular where the controller is a public authority 
and it is therefore unlikely that consent was freely given in all the circumstances of that specific situation”. 
ELAG members agreed that it would be doubtful that consent of travellers could legally be used by public 
border control authorities to speed up their public interest missions. 
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4 PROTECT panel at the 2018 International conference on 
computers, privacy and data protection  
4.1 Introduction  
The University of Namur (UNAMUR) organized a panel on behalf of the PROTECT project at the 11th 
International conference on computers, privacy and data protection (CPDP2018). This conference offered 85 
panel sessions with 420 international speakers from academia, public and private sectors and civil society. 
CPDP2018 received 1110 registrations in total. The conference was attended by over 1000 attendees from 
55 countries and over 70% of the attendees coming from outside Belgium. 
 
Figure 2 - Presentation of the CPDP2018 
 
The programme of this conference is available for download at this address: 
http://www.cpdpconferences.org/assets/CPDP2018_PROGRAM_FINAL.pdf 
The panel organized by UNAMUR at CPDP 2018 took place on January 25th at 16.00 and was entitled “Privacy 
and data protection issues related to the use of contactless multimodal biometrics at border-crossings”. 
The topic of this panel was as follows:  
“In order to facilitate security and fluency of Schengen Area external cross-border movements, projects 
propose to develop multimodal biometric solutions for contactless identity confirmation of travellers. For 
the purposes of multimodal biometric ID verification, project partners proposed to design and develop a 
biometric corridor, which would incorporate a number of biometric sensors. The initial plan is to include such 
biometrics as: face recognition, iris recognition, vein pattern recognition, speaker recognition as well as 
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anthropometric recognition. When operational, the beneficiaries of the multimodal biometric system being 
developed should be persons enjoying the Union right of free movement as well as third country nationals. 
This session will bring together academic experts in the field of data protection at border-crossings and policy 
representatives to discuss the privacy implications of contactless multimodal biometrics at the external 
borders”. 
The questions that were discussed included: 
 How to improve the border control process with new biometric modalities and increase convenience 
and speed? Practical aspects.    
 
 Legal constraints deriving from legislation regulating EU travel documents, Schengen IT systems and 
legislation regulating privacy and data protection? 
  
 Contactless biometrics in the context of the legislative initiatives related to Smart Borders and 
“interoperability” of large-scale IT databases? 
 




Figure 3 - PROTECT panel at the CPDP2018 on Youtube 
 
4.2 Panelists 
Chair: Diana Dimitrova is a researcher at FIZ Karlsruhe. Previously she worked as a legal researcher for 3.5 
years at the law faculty of the University of Leuven (KUL) in Belgium. Her research focuses mainly on privacy 
and data protection, especially in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. She carried out her research in 
the framework of the FastPass and eVACUATE projects at KUL.  In 2012 she completed a five-month 
traineeship at the Supervision and Enforcement Unit of the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) in 
Brussels and holds an LLM in European Law from the University of Leiden, NL.  
Moderator: Prof. Cecile de Terwangne has a MD in Law (University of Louvain), a PhD in Law (University of 
Namur) and a LLM in European and International Law (European Universitary Institute of Florence). She is 
professor at the Law Faculty of the University of Namur (Belgium). She teaches courses in Computer and 
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Human Rights, and Data Protection. She is director of the post-graduate Program in Law and Management 
of Information and Communication Technologies at the University of Namur. She is head of the Freedoms in 
the Information Society Unit of the Research Centre in ICT, law and Society (CRIDS – University of Namur). 
She has taken part to numerous European and national researches in the fields of data protection, privacy 
and ICT, freedom of information, e.Governement, etc. She is director of the « Revue du droit des technologies 
de l'information » (R.D.T.I.). She has also written numerous articles published in national and international 
scientific journals. 
Speakers: 
  Frank Schmalz is Director Innovations & Business Development at Veridos.  
 
 Mikko Simola is JHA Counsellor at the Permanent Representation of Finland to the EU.  
 
 Franck Dumortier is senior researcher at the Information Technology, Law and Society Research 
Centre (CRIDS) at the University of Namur since 2005. He also was assistant teacher in “Sources and 
Principles of law” between 2008 and 2013. His research particularly focuses on cybersecurity and 
cybercrime law and their links with the fundamental human rights to privacy and to data protection. 
He published numerous articles in national and international journals and participated to several 
European projects – such as the B-CCENTRE (the Belgian Cybercrime Centre of Excellence for Training 
and Education) - in his research fields.   He is lecturer of legal aspects of IT security in the Master in 
Cybersecurity and teaches cybercrime and cybersecurity law in several educational programs.  
 
 Lara Smit is legal officer in the policy and consultation unit of the European Data Protection 




Professor Cecile de Terwangne opened the panel by recalling that the event was linked to the PROTECT 
project and presented the speakers, highlighting that these had very complimentary profiles: two researchers 
in the field of data protection (Diana Dimitrova and Franck Dumortier), a speaker representing industry (Frank 
Schmalz), a specialist in border control (Mikko Simola) and a representative of the European Data Protection 
Supervisor (Lara Smit).  
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Figure 4 - Audience at the PROTECT panel 
 
The floor was first given to Diana Dimitrova who is data protection researcher at FIZ Karlsruhe and carried 
out research in the framework of the FastPass project. In her introduction, Diana gave a brief overview of the 
existing large-scale IT databases at EU level in the context of border control. She started by presenting the 
SISII database, recalling that it contains numerous alerts – one category of alerts concerning return decisions 
against third country nationals (TCNs) who are not allowed to enter the Schengen Area if they are subjects 
of an entry ban. Another category of alerts in SISII concerns law enforcement cooperation and consists of 
alerts on missing people, suspects, victims of crime as well as information about stolen objects such as 
identity documents, banknotes and vehicles. The biometrics stored in SISII are currently facial image and 
fingerprints but the SISII is currently being revised, and there are proposals to also include DNA and palm 
prints in it. Another information system is the visa information system (VIS) which contains data on TCNs who 
apply for a short stay visa to enter the Schengen area. VIS contains an alphanumeric date or biographical data 
such as a name, passport number, nationality, as well as fingerprints and facial images. EURODAC is a third 
existing database containing currently only the fingerprints of asylum seekers. The purpose of this database 
is to make sure that that an asylum seeker hasn’t already applied for asylum in another Member State. If they 
have, they should be returned to that Member State to apply for asylum. There is a plan to expand the 
EURODAC to also include alphanumeric data or biographical data and to lower the age of the of the people 
who should be fingerprinted from 14 to 6 years of age. SISII, VIS and EURODAC are the existing EU large-scale 
databases in the border control context but three more are in the pipeline. One of them is the entry exit 
system (EES), which just got its legal basis and is starting to be built. It will apply to all TCNs who enter the 
European Union or Schengen area for a short visit to ensure that they do not overstay the 90 day limit. In the 
EES, people will also have to provide fingerprints and facial images next to the alphanumeric data and it will 
apply to all TCNs on a short stay visit no matter whether they need to have a visa there or not. There is also 
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the proposal on the European criminal records for third country nationals (ECRIS TCN-system) so that there 
is a common database for TCNs who are convicted in a Member State. This database will also contain 
fingerprints and facial images and it's more a tool for judicial cooperation. Last but not least, there is a 
proposal called ETIAS (The European Travel Information and Authorisation System), which would seek to 
collect only biographical data without biometric data for all those TCNs who don't need a visa to enter the 
Schengen area. Since the ETIAS system does not contain biometrics it does not directly relate to the panel’s 
discussion topic, but is worth mentioning as part of the interoperability concept. After presenting the 
background of existing and possibly future IT large scale databases in the context of EU external border 
control, Diana Dimitrova gave the floor to Franck Dumortier.  
Franck Dumortier is senior researcher at the Information Technology, Law and Society Research Centre 
(CRIDS) at the University of Namur and lecturer in cybersecurity law. His research particularly focuses on 
security and cybercrime law and their links with the fundamental human rights to privacy and to data 
protection. He is the legal and privacy adviser in the context of the PROTECT project. Franck spoke about the 
legal constraints that are raised in the PROTECT project. First, he recalled that the earth is a globe on which 
free movement of people is the most natural thing; on the contrary, borders are human legal constructions 
which constitute interferences with fundamental rights such as free movement and privacy. The right to 
privacy is mainly regulated by article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). According to 
article 8, §2 ECHR, interferences with that right must be provided by law and proportionate for the aim that 
is pursued. The concept of the PROTECT project is to develop a multimodal biometric solution for identity 
confirmation on the move of travellers with the aim to enhance border security as well as facilitate cross-
border movement. The first question raised by Franck is what is meant by “facilitating cross-border 
movement”.  According to him, that purpose is not very clear because lots of things can be “facilitated” in 
the context of cross-border movement. Specifying more clearly the purpose of PROTECT is important in the 
context of data protection in order to apply the purpose limitation principle, which is one of the core 
principles of personal data protection regulation. Franck continued by explaining that to pursue that non-
specific purpose, the PROTECT project proposes to process various emerging biometric modalities which 
would be fused such 3d face, periocular, finger veins, voice and anthropometrics.  
 
Figure 5 - Additional biometrics developed in PROTECT 
 
An important question related to the development of such additional biometric modalities is how to combine 
these new modalities with the statement of the European Council of Thessaloniki in 2003 which affirmed that 
a coherent approach is needed in the European Union on biometric identifiers or biometric data for 
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documents for TCNs, European citizens passports and information systems. As Diana recalled, current IT 
databases (SISII, VIS and EES) contain facial images and fingerprints. This is also the case in passports and 
resident permits. By consequence, travellers are checked on the basis of these “traditional” biometrics when 
crossing external borders.  
 
 
Figure 6 - Biometrics in current travel documents and existing EU databases 
 
Taking this into account, from a pragmatic point of view, the main question in PROTECT is how to implement 
new biometric modalities, taking into account the fact that EU cross-border databases will still have to be 
checked on the basis of facial images and fingerprints. A second question is which basis of lawfulness could 
legitimate the processing of these additional biometrics. Article 4(14) of the GDPR defines “biometric data” 
as “personal data resulting from specific technical processing relating to the physical, physiological or 
behavioural characteristics of a natural person, which allow or confirm the unique identification of that 
natural person, such as facial images or dactyloscopic data”. In its Opinion 4/2007 (WP136), the Article 29 
Working Party specified that biometric data are “biological properties, behavioural aspects, physiological 
characteristics, living traits or repeatable actions where those features and/or actions are both unique to 
that individual and measurable, even if the patterns used in practice to technically measure them involve a 
certain degree of probability.” By consequence, biometric data (raw and templates) are considered as 
“sensitive data” under the GDPR. As stated by article 9(1) of the GDPR, the principle is that “processing 
biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person […] shall be prohibited”. Exceptions 
to that principle are listed in article 9(2) of the GDPR: processing of biometric data for border-crossing 
purposes is possible only if: 
− the data subject has given explicit consent to the processing of those personal data for one or more 
specified purposes, except where Union or Member State law provide that the prohibition may not 
be lifted by the data subject; 
Deliverable D2.5v1 PROTECT H2020 Project No. 700259 
 Page 27 of 56 
 
 
− processing is necessary for reasons of substantial public interest, on the basis of Union or Member 
State law which shall be proportionate to the aim pursued, respect the essence of the right to data 
protection and provide for suitable and specific measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and 
the interests of the data subject. 
 
Taking this legal reality into account, an important question is hence to determine the adequate basis of 
lawfulness for the use of new contactless biometric modalities which are being developed in the PROTECT 
project.  
Could consent be used as an adequate basis of lawfulness for the use of these new biometric modalities? 
According to article 4(11) of the GDPR “Consent means any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous 
indication of the data subject's wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, 
signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her”. Furthermore, according to 
article 7(3), “the data subject shall have the right to withdraw his or her consent at any time”. Additionally, 
for biometric data, consent must be “explicit”. Concerning renewability and revocability, in its opinion 
3/2012, the Article 29 Working Party stated that “as the source of biometric data cannot be changed, 
biometric systems whose purpose is to establish an identity link must be designed in a way that the 
enrolment process and the processing of biometric data allows that multiple and independent biometric 
templates can be extracted from the same source in order to be able to replace them in the case of a data 
breach or a technological evolution. Biometric systems should be designed in a way that allows to revoke the 
identity link, either in order to renew it or to permanently delete it e.g. when the consent is revoked”. More 
importantly, Franck asked whether free choice of data subjects for border control convenience is possible. 
This is very doubtful when looking at recital 43 of the GDPR, which states that “in order to ensure that consent 
is freely given, consent should not provide a valid legal ground for the processing of personal data in a specific 
case where there is a clear imbalance between the data subject and the controller, in particular where the 
controller is a public authority and it is therefore unlikely that consent was freely given in all the 
circumstances of that specific situation”. This means that the use of additional biometrics on the basis of 
consent for “facilitating” public authorities’ mission in the field of border control is at least very controversial, 
if not illegal. However, the basis of consent is still possible for “commercial” purposes which are not strictly 
linked to public authorities’ missions. For example, in a 2005 deliberation, the CNIL (French DPA) authorized 
the use of fingerprints on a fidelity chipcard for frequent travellers of the airport of Nice. The system was 
designed for convenience purposes (facilitate access to parking zones, additional services, etc). In this 
context, important conditions imposed by CNIL were 1) the voluntary use, and 2) the storage on an object 
(no centralized database). 
Given that consent is not the most adequate basis of lawfulness for the use of additional biometrics in a 
public context, another option is to use is Union and or Member State law. Article 8(d) of Regulation (EU) 
2017/2225 of 30 November 2017 amending the Schengen Border Code (SBC) allows Member States to 
establish “voluntary” National Facilitation Programs (NFPs). As stated by this Regulation, the purpose of NFPs 
would be to waive pre-vetted and pre-cleared TCNs from the requirement to be interviewed on their means 
of subsistence, purpose of travel and point of departure and destination. By consequence, the issues with 
this basis of lawfulness are twofold: first, according to the SBC amendment, NFPs would be possible only for 
TCNs but not for EU/EEA/CH travellers; secondly, the purpose of such NFPs would be only to “facilitate” TCNs’ 
requirements for interview on their means of subsistence, purpose of travel and point of departure and 
destination…but not to “speed up border control databases checks”. So even for TCNs, SIS, VIS and EES will 
still have to be checked and “traditional” biometrics (as legally standardized) would still be required.   
By consequence, taking into account the SBC amendment, the purpose of using additional biometrics being 
developed within the PROTECT project could legally only be used by TCNs under potential NFPs national laws 
for the abovementioned purposes. Additionally, such national laws should be proportionate and comply with 
data protection principles enshrined in article 5 of the GDPR: purpose limitation, data minimization, accuracy, 
storage limitation, integrity and confidentiality.  
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Concerning proportionality, in its opinion 3/2012, the Article 29 Working Party stated that “The use of 
biometrics raises the issue of proportionality of each category of processed data in the light of the purpose 
for which the data are processed. As biometric data may only be used if adequate, relevant and not excessive, 
it implies a strict assessment of the necessity and proportionality of the processed data and if the intended 
purpose could be achieved in a less intrusive way. 1) In analysing the proportionality of a proposed biometric 
system a prior consideration is whether the system is necessary to meet the identified need, i.e. is essential 
for satisfying that need rather than being the most convenient or cost effective. 2) A second factor to take 
into consideration is whether the system is likely to be effective in meeting that need by having regard to the 
specific characteristics of the biometric technology planned to be used. 3) A third aspect to consider is 
whether the resulting loss of privacy is proportional to any anticipated benefit. If the benefit is relatively 
minor, such as an increase in convenience or a slight cost saving, then the loss of privacy is not appropriate.  
4) The fourth aspect in assessing the adequacy of a biometric system is to consider whether a less privacy 
intrusive means could achieve the desired end”. Moreover, the Article 29 Working Party emphasizes that 
“whenever it is permitted to process biometric data, it is preferred to avoid the centralised storage of the 
personal biometric information”. Especially for verification, the Working Party considers it advisable that 
“biometric systems are based on the reading of biometric data stored as encrypted templates on media that 
are held exclusively by the relevant data subjects (e.g. smart cards or similar devices). Their biometric 
features can be compared with the template(s) stored on the card and/or device by means of standard 
comparison procedures that are implemented directly on the card and/or device in question, whereby the 
creation of a database including biometric information should be, in general and if possible, avoided. Indeed, 
if the card and/or device is lost or mislaid, there are currently limited risks that the biometric information 
they contain may be misused. To reduce the risk of identity theft, limited identification data related to the 
data subject should be stored in such devices”. Applying the principle of data minimization to biometrics, the 
Article 29 Working Party considers that “biometric data should be stored as biometric templates whenever 
that is possible. Template should be extracted in a way that is specific to that biometric system and not used 
by other controllers of similar systems in order to make sure that a person can only be identified in those 
biometric systems that have a legal basis for this operation”. The goal of this statement is obviously to avoid 
illegitimate interoperability. Additionally, the Article 29 Working Party emphasizes that “The definition of the 
size (the quantity of information) of the template is a crucial issue. On the one hand, the size of the template 
should be wide enough to manage security (avoiding overlaps between different biometric data, or identity 
substitutions), on the other hand, the size of the template should not be too large so as to avoid the risks of 
biometric data reconstruction. The generation of the template should be a one-way process, in that it should 
not be possible to regenerate the raw biometric data from the template”. The accuracy principle should also 
be applied to biometrics: the Article 29 Working Party recommends anti-spoofing mechanisms by stating that 
“to maintain the reliability of a biometric system and prevent identity fraud, the manufacturer has to 
implement systems aiming to determine if the biometric data is both genuine and still connected to a natural 
person. In respect of facial recognition, it may be critical to ensure that the face is a real one and not, for 
example, a picture tied on an impostor’s head”. Concerning the storage limitation principle, automated data 
erasure mechanisms are recommended: “in order to prevent that biometric information are stored for longer 
than is necessary for the purposes for which they were collected or subsequently processed, appropriate 
automated data erasure mechanisms have to be implemented also in case the retention period may be 
lawfully extended, assuring the timely deletion of personal data that become unnecessary for the operation 
of the biometric system. When using integrated storage on the reader, manufacturers may also implement 
storage of the biometric templates on volatile memory that guarantees that the data will be erased when 
the reader is unplugged. Therefore, no biometric database remains when the reader is sold or uninstalled. 
Anti-pulling switches may also be used to automatically erase the data if someone tries to steal the reader”. 
Finally, the Article 29 Working Party applies the data security principle to biometrics by writing that “the 
biometric system used and the security measures chosen should limit the mentioned risks and make sure 
that the re-use of the biometric data in question for further purposes is impossible or at least traceable. 
Mechanisms based on cryptographic technologies, in order to prevent the unauthorised reading, copying, 
modification or removal of biometric data should be used (…) When the biometric data are stored on a device 
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that the data subject physically controls, a specific encryption key for the reader devices should be used as 
an effective safeguard to protect these data from unauthorised access”. 
The floor was then given to Frank Schmalz, who is Director Innovations and Business Development at Veridos 
GmbH. Frank started his presentation by recalling that the H2020 call by the European Union to make this 
PROTECT research project is obviously the consequence of statistics on the progress of air traffic and 
travellers: in the next 20 years, there will be a doubling of air traffic travellers and we have of course the issue 
how to handle these travellers at the borders.  
 
Figure 7 - Air traffic increase in the next 20 years 
 
Two options are possible. The first is to install more E-gates but this basically means that we will need more 
space at the airports, where space is very limited and the perspective of 20 years will probably not change 
this issue. The second option is basically to speed up the process at the borders but therefore new 
approaches are needed since the E-gates are processing travellers too slowly. Frank then reminded the main 
aims of the BES-6 call “Secure societies –  Protecting freedom and security of Europe and its citizens”:1) 
Exploration of new biometric modalities at borders, 2) a most fluent non-intrusive control process is desired 
and 3) the ethical, societal and data protection aspects should be embraced. Frank continued by presenting 
the PROTECT consortium members explaining that not only Universities are involved but also end users, for 
example the Polish border guard and the UK Home Office, and Veridos as industry partner.  
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Figure 8 - Presentation of the PROTECT's consortium 
 
The final goal of the PROTECT project is building a demonstrator that should show how the new modalities 
developed by PROTECT academic partners could work. One central research question within PROTECT is 
template protection. One major issue with template protection is that it reduces accuracy, while the law 
imposes to take care of accuracy and anti-spoofing at the same time. A way to achieve such a goal is to 
combine several biometric features to have better accuracy - even though we have template protection - and 
also to have better anti-spoofing capabilities. So this would be the advantage to use multiple biometrics in 
the area we are looking at in PROTECT. Within the PROTECT project, we are looking at two scenarios: a) air 
& sea border where individuals are on the move and b) land border where individuals are in or on vehicles. 
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Figure 9 - Border contexts taken into account within PROTECT  
When focusing on the first scenario, for travellers walking over the border, the current technical system that 
is used for automated order control is E-gates. If you're looking at speeds, we can see that reading out the 
document takes about five to six seconds and the next step that is taking a lot of time is the gate mechanics 
which takes about 10 seconds. If everything goes well, the total processing time is 15 to 18 seconds for E-
gates. So coming to the question on how can we can gain speed, if you are looking at the reading of the 
document, we have a lot of issues stemming from the fact that people have to put the document on the 
reader. Ideally, it takes five to six seconds to read out the document, but if travellers make mistakes – and 
this happens often – then it's taking even longer: so this is an interesting point to ameliorate. When looking 
at additional biometrics, enrollment could be required once per document lifetime. Kiosks could be located 
at foreign airports where travellers would enroll additional biometrics such as anthropometrics, 2D face, 3D 
face, thermal face, periocular, iris, finger veins, voice and hand veins. Those data would be stored on the 
smartphones of the travellers, because we cannot put them on the passport since the content of travel 
documents is being strictly regulated. We could store those additional biometric data in a database but we 
don't want to do that because this is also something that is not desirable from the legal point of view from 
what we have seen so far from European decisions of the European Parliament. Using smartphones as data 
carriers bypass these problems, and offers additional benefits: travellers carry them on their person all the 
time, and data transmission methods with smartphones are very easy to handle and so the handling problems 
we have currently with the passport reading are avoided.  
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Figure 10 - Two ways to save time in the ABC process 
 
Frank then illustrated the proposed verification process being proposed by the PROTECT consortium. A 
traveller would approach the border with a smartphone and then walk into a corridor where he is on the 
move. The biometrics are verified before the data is transferred to the system from the smartphones: so a 
user presses a button, the data is transferred to the system then the verification takes place and then 
afterwards the data can be erased from the system again. So, this is a very similar process to that currently 
used with the E-gates.  
 
 
Figure 11 - Mobile scenario description 
One issue of course if you are dealing with smartphones is the fact that these are not very secure devices. 
Some manufacturers take measures to improve security but that's very individual to each model so what 
we're thinking about is basically putting the data not in plain on the smartphone but in an encrypted manner. 
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The encryption keys would be in the background system and would be accessed at the moment when the 
verification takes place. So the encrypted data is transferred to the system, it's decrypted, used and then it's 
thrown away.  
 
Figure 12 - Secure storage on arbitrary smartphone 
 
Cecile de Terwangne gave the floor to Mikko Simola, who is JHA Counsellor at the Permanent Representation 
of Finland to the EU. Mikko Simola has previously worked as a border security expert responsible for EU 
coordination and Schengen matters and has practical border control experience for almost twenty years. 
Mikko Simola’s intervention 1) focused on how to facilitate security and fluency of cross-border traffic when 
further developing the use of biometrics, 2) mentioned the operational environment from the EU external 
borders’ point of view and then 3) explored aspects which from the speaker’s point of view are important to 
take into account when further developing the use of biometrics in the future. Currently, the scale of 
estimated border crossings via the border crossing points at the external borders of the EU is just over 700 
million annually, and based on some studies it has been estimated that in five years it will be approximately 
880 million. The vast majority will definitely travel by airports but we have heard already today that it's 
important not to forget the almost 300 million other passengers that travel to EU via land borders which is 
certainly an important aspect from the Finnish point of 
view. Also important is to take into account people 
travelling via the sea borders. During the last years in 
the migration crisis, sometimes when you are following 
the public debate from the speaker’s point of view, the 
focus is - for obvious reasons perhaps - on the border 
surveillance which is happening between the border 
crossing points, not so much on the border crossing 
points activities which is important certainly taking into 
account the fact that the main bulk of the border 
crossings will luckily take place in the future at the 
border crossing points. So for example, thinking about 
the main migration crisis from the EU perspective in 
2015, the detections of illegal border crossings at the 
Figure 13 - Mikko Simola at PROTECT's CPDP2018 
panel 
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border crossing points was something like 1.8 million if we calculate the travelling through the Western 
Balkans as well and still it's quite a small figure comparing to the 800 million via these border crossing points. 
Looking at the environment at the external borders, it's important to remember-  also in the development 
projects - that changes are quite rapid and it's difficult to predict different factors from political or economic 
instability to climate change, but certainly the main challenges for border management are related to the 
secure and fluent control of the continuously growing passenger flows. This so called double aim of border 
checks, not only focusing on the security but remembering the fluency is an important point because from 
the speaker’s point of view fluency contributes the to the security from the border guard perspective.  
Mikko Simola then gave a few words on the integrated border management (IBM) concept. Nowadays, use 
of state-of-the-art technology is one of the 11 strategic elements of the IBM integrated border management 
concept which was for the first time defined on legislative level in 2016 when the regulation on the European 
border and Coast Guard entered into force. Technical development is one new element because, as we have 
heard from the previous speakers, it enables many things in the future and it's important that the border 
management is supported by advanced mobile and interoperable European technical systems because what 
border guards needs as end-users is fast and seamless access to information they need based on the law in 
order to perform their tasks taking into account the fluency aspect as well. Therefore, these large-scale IT 
systems we heard from the first intervention need to be continuously aligned with the strategic objectives. 
Availability and quality of the information are two important points. Practical measures for ensuring data 
accuracy is also one thing which need to be focused on: a main challenge is the problem of multiple identities. 
Biometrics is necessary for combating that problem. The entry exit system (EES) which hopefully will be in 
place in 2020 for third country nationals is important for enhancing the efficiency of politics. The 
implementation phase of the EES which is currently ongoing is an important thing: facial image and 
fingerprints will play a crucial role for identifying TCNs in a reliable way. Mikko Simola then mentioned that 
sometimes the second part of the double aim of border checks - the fluency - is forgotten in the debates and 
discussions when the EU regulations are being negotiated. These technologies should allow “bona fide” and 
business travellers to be identified properly and conveniently in a short period of time and they should not 
be mixed or with so-called “mala fide” travellers having, for example, the same name and alphanumerical 
data. According to the speaker, one could even say that the fluency of cross-border traffic is a fundamental 
right of a person: his right to freedom of movement. Having this perspective in mind, one reason explaining 
the problem related to incomplete information, difficulties to detect multiple identities and combat identity 
fraud is that the identity data including biometrics is nowadays stored in separate information systems which 
are quite fragmented from the end users’ point of view. It is still quite difficult to detect multiple identities 
and to combat identity fraud since it's nowadays possible that people are recorded under different identities 
in different systems without being detected. So hopefully this problem will be mainly solved and tackled by 
the latest Commission's proposals related to the interoperability of the EU information systems.  From the 
practitioners’ point of view that kind of component which would show the links between multiple identities 
corresponding to the same biometric identifiers to the authorities which are involved in the border 
management could provide a powerful tool for detecting and combating identity fraud and improving 
internal security. This so-called shared biometric matching service would enable searches across different 
information systems holding biometric data. Mikko Simola then said a few words about pragmatic issues. 
End users realized that border checks improvement should take into account different conditions and means 
of transportation when analyzing technical solutions. For example, checking the biometrics in a moving train 
while ensuring fluency at the same time or outside on a car lane where the passengers are in the car in a 
temperature of minus 35 degrees certainly create challenges for ensuring the smooth and convenient way 
of handling the border checks and proceed to biometrical verification.  Looking a bit more to the future, 
Mikko Simola expressed his view that certainly the kind of research activity conducted within the PROTECT 
project can create important basis for changing and widening the use of biometrics in a proper manner. 
Solutions which are proposed such as biometric corridors using face recognition or other biometrics on the 
move and identifying passengers at the airports would certainly benefit travellers and border guards if the 
verification could be done before the passengers arrive to the border control. Finally, the speaker mentioned 
four points for further developing biometric solutions. First, it’s important to set and develop time limits for 
biometric data to be pre-checked and transmitted. With this regard the issue of using proper templates is an 
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important factor because otherwise we will create huge delays in performing border checks at the border 
crossing points. Secondly, the quality of biometrical data is an important challenge: there can be difficulties 
in enrolling biometrics with the proper quality, especially in challenging field conditions outside or in moving 
carriers. Admission of lower quality of biometrics would result in reduced application performance which 
would cause delays and challenges for the law enforcement authorities. Thirdly, the so-called query capacity 
of different IT systems we are using now needs to be updated to cope with the increased number of 
passengers. The fourth point is the most important and perhaps the most practical one. Practical aspects and 
common-sense need to be remembered. So-called facilitation programs are important to consider when 
further developing the use of biometrics at the border crossing points from the practitioners’ point of view. 
In addition to the operational environment and conditions of the border crossing points, the interests of 
“bona fide” travellers like businessmen need to be taken into account in a wise manner. For example, 
biometrics of so called pre-vetted trusted travellers benefiting from these facilitation programs should not 
always be verified electronically. This is one important aspect we managed to put into the new entry exit 
system regulation because in that way we can give border guard practitioners more time to focus on 
detecting those passengers which should be detected.  
The floor was then given to Lara Smit, who represented the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS). 
Lara Smit is legal officer in the policy and consultation unit of the EDPS. She mainly focuses on large-scale IT 
systems for border control, migration and police cooperation.  
Lara started by recalling that migration border control and these large-scale IT systems haven’t been off the 
agenda for many years. Actually, a lot has been going on in this area at EU level and a lot is still going on. In 
her speech, she first wanted to discuss a bit more about the smart borders package and then say a few words 
about the recent legislative proposals of the Commission on interoperability of large-scale IT systems. 
Starting with the smart borders package, the speaker recalled that the package was made of two regulations 
that were proposed by the Commission back in 2016: one establishing the entry exit system (EES) and the 
other integrating the changes that are needed to use the EES in the Schengen Border Code. The EES will 
record all entries and exits of TCNs (non-EU citizens) in the Schengen area but also all refusals of entry. By 
doing so, the idea is to replace the current system of stamping all passports of country nationals and to record 
these entry entries and exits electronically in a large-scale database. 
This idea of creating the EES is not new: it dates back to 2008 when 
it appeared for the first time in a Commission communication and so 
after almost ten years it has now become law. The regulations were 
published in the Official Journal in December and entered into force 
in December. The reason why it took a very long time is because it 
was a first smart border package was tabled back in 2013 but it got 
stopped at the time by the European Parliament due to data 
protection concerns because the EES needed to store very important 
amounts of personal data (alphanumeric data but also biometric 
data). In the current EES regulation, the system will rely on the facial 
image and four fingerprints but the first proposal required the 
storage of ten fingerprints and the facial image of all TCNs for 181 
days. In the current regulation, the collection of biometric data is reduced to four fingerprints and the facial 
image but the storage period (5 years) has increased compared to the first proposal. The EDPS has been 
involved in in these debates from the very first start and issued opinions on both the first and the second 
smart borders packages. Since the entry/exit will imply a significant collection, storage and use of personal 
data of TCNs, the legislator had among others considerations for fundamental rights to privacy and data 
protection that are protected under article 7 & 8 of the EU Charter. The data processing envisaged with the 
building up of this of this new large-scale IT system to be compatible with the Charter had to comply with all 
the conditions of article 52 including the requirements of necessity and proportionality. The EDPS considered 
from the start that the processing of personal data implied by the EES were significant and intrusive, 
especially when taking into account the number of persons that would be affected by the system, the type 
of information (alphanumeric data and biometric data) that would be processed through the system, but also 
Figure 14 - Lara Smit at PROTECT's 
CPDP2018 panel 
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the different purposes of the system because aside from the border management and the facilitation 
purposes there is also a law enforcement access that is created  in the in the regulation. Under certain 
conditions, national competent authorities could have access to the EES data. So in the second entry exit 
proposal, the EDPS has welcomed the fact that the datasets and the number of biometric data that TCNs 
have to provide had been reduced. We also raised concerns regarding several aspects of the text such as the 
longer data retention periods and, finally, we also had concerns about the necessity and proportionality of 
these accesses by law enforcement authorities. They would have to make a request and this meets a number 
of conditions but we still had concerns about the necessity and proportionality of such access. The plan is 
now to have this system ready by 2020. The new agency in charge of large-scale IT system (ELISA) is 
responsible for building the system and for managing the system once it starts its operation. The question 
remains how exactly the collection and the matching of these four fingerprints and the facial in image will 
take place at border crossing points. This is not very clear in the entry exit regulation. For travellers who have 
a visa, they won't need to have their fingerprints taken a second time since their fingerprints are already 
available in the visa information system (VIS) so this information will be retrieved from the visa information 
system (VIS). The second regulation of the small borders package contains a modification of the Schengen 
Borders Code and it provides some precisions in this regard and it includes provisions on the use of 
automated border control systems such as self-service systems and E-gates where the passengers would be 
able to proceed themselves to not all but some of the border checks. It provides definitions for this 
technology but it leaves it to Member States to decide whether or not and to what extent they will use these 
technologies. For instance they could use a combination of E-gate and self-service system, one of them or all 
of them. The text specifies that this technology should always be used under the supervision of border guards 
in order to be able to detect any fraud. To be able to use this technology, TCNs will need a passport with a 
chip whose authenticity will have to be checked and on which a facial image will have to be stored to allow 
identity verification. They should be designed in such a way that they can be used by all travellers except for 
children under 12 and also in a way that fully respects human dignity in particular in cases involving 
vulnerable persons. Finally, another precision in the Schengen Borders Code is that a sufficient number of 
staff members should also be present to assist travellers with the use of this system, which might be very 
easy for some of us but not for everyone.  All these specifications in the Schengen Border Code still leaves 
much room for maneuver to Member States, so perhaps we'll see the possibility to collect this biometric data 
on the move but also on the way they will implement data protection safeguards for the use of these 
technologies which could have a very direct and concrete impact on travellers.  
After having talked about the Smart Border package Lara Smit then said also few words on Interoperability. 
The EDPS still have not issued a position on this proposal that was tabled in December. The EDPS was involved 
in the work of the high-level expert group on information systems that was launched by the Commission and 
that was assessing the different possibilities to set up interoperability between the existing and future large-
scale IT systems. The EDPS also issued a preliminary statement in annex to their final report and a reflection 
paper on interoperability but no public position of the EDPS on the final proposal is available yet.  In any 
event, what the Commission is proposing with these two proposals on interoperability is to stop the 
functioning of existing and future large-scale IT systems in silos, and to make them talk with each other. To 
do so they propose to build what they call a European search portal that would allow border guards to search 
the system at once, simultaneously, and have combined results from all of them instead of having to go and 
check SIS, VIS and EURODAC one by one. So the results will be quicker and they would have combined results, 
but also a shared biometric matching system that would allow search based on biometrics across several 
systems - based for now on only the facial image and fingerprints and a common identity repository 
alphanumeric data of different systems. The EDPS will issue an opinion in the next months on this proposal.  
 
5 Conclusion 
A critical issue with the processing of biometrics at border crossings is that it constitutes in an interference 
with fundamental human rights such as the right of liberty and the rights to privacy and data protection. 
Since greater use of personal data impacts upon human rights, there needs to be an honest and assertive 
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study of what the risks are to privacy and how these risks are mitigated. For that reason, the aim of D2.5 is 
to identify and address the ethical and legal implications of the technical solutions being developed in the 
context of the PROTECT project by summarizing discussions between the project partners and exchanges 
with the Ethical and Legal Advisory Group (ELAG) as well as with other external experts. 
The meeting “on the impact of privacy regulations on system architecture & technical solutions” (which was 
organized on 4th July 2017),  the first ELAG meeting (which was held on July 5th 2017) and the panel at the 
11th International conference on computers, privacy and data protection (which took place on January 25th 
2018) were three important opportunities for constructive exchanges about legal, privacy and data 
protection issues related to the development and use of contactless multimodal biometrics at external 
border crossings.  
Both the regulatory framework governing EU border control databases and the one regulating data 
protection were recently, or are currently being, modified. Some examples are the GDPR, the EES Regulation, 
the SBC amendment, the ETIAS proposal and the interoperability initiative. All of these new constraints as 
well as the general privacy principles should be carefully assessed while developing contactless multimodal 
biometrics at border crossings in the PROTECT project. The interesting exchanges on these issues with the 
ELAG and with other experts will, of course, be taken into account.   
Please note that this deliverable is a first version of D2.5. A second version D2.5 – Societal impact report is 
due at M34 and will integrate the next discussions and exchanges on ethical and legal issues with the ELAG 
and other external experts. 
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Appendix I Presentations given at the CPDP2018 conference 
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I.2 Frank Schmalz’s presentation  
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